At the very end of the fourth century, an Alexandrian poet employed as spin doctor at the western imperial court expressed his dismay about a looming food-crisis.
To what a shadow of our former glory are we by gradual decline arrived! [ . . . ] The emperors rewarded me with Africa and Egypt that they might nourish the sovereign people and the Senate, [ . . . ] by means of summer-sped fleets, and that the winds, blowing alternately from either shore, should fill our granaries with corn. Our provisioning was secure. Should Memphis perchance have denied us food, I would make up for the failure of Egypt's harvest by the African supply. I saw competition between grain-bearing vessels,
The final results of this article were made possible thanks to generous research funding provided by the "Research Council of Flanders" (= F. W. O). I would like to thank Mark Humphries, Philip Rance, Conor Whately, and the anonymous referee for feedback on specific issues. Adrastos Omissi was so kind to send me an advance preview of his invaluable study on late Roman usurpation. The late Mike Clover also sent personal notes that helped me to reflect more widely on the theme. One of the core ideas ingrained in the thesis of this article, ultimately goes back more than a decade ago to an MA paper written at Università di Bologna for Valerio Neri. I'd like to dedicate this article to him, for his teaching, generosity in time and counsel, and tremendous scholarship during a crucial period of my education. and where'er I looked I beheld the fleet of Carthage strive in rivalry with that of the Nile. When a second Rome arose and the Eastern Empire assumed the toga of the West, Egypt fell beneath that new sway. Africa remained our only hope and scarcely did she suffice to feed us, whose corn-ships none but the south wind wafted across. Her promise for the future was insecure, as, ever helpless, she demanded the loyalty of the wind and of the season. This province, too, Gildo seized towards the close of autumn. 1 The revolt of Gildo, comes et magister utriusque militiae per Africam or senior commander of the African field army, in 397 ce, provides us with a clear case of how the food supply to Italy was deliberately tampered with for reasons of political or military expediency. Scholars studying the later Roman Empire have asserted that this was a powerful tactic (employed both by imperial commanders and later the Vandal reges). 2 We will test this assertion, by examining cases where it was definitely disrupted, cases where it may have been sabotaged, but also cases where this tactic was not employed. These cases range from roughly 310 to 425. We will begin this survey with the civil wars following the demise of Diocletian's Tetrarchy, a conventional enough starting point for the later Roman Empire, and finish with the accession of Valentinian III in 425, during whose reign Africa was lost to the Vandals.
Before we can start examining Africa's position during these civil wars, it is of course necessary to establish the importance of its grain supply. 3 First of all, we need to point out that this grain was mainly directed to the city of Rome. At no time did North Africa feed the entire Italian peninsula. The supply of Rome (and later Constantinople) is one of the prime examples in antiquity of a continuous transport of cheap goods in abundant amounts over a supra-regional distance. The emperors took great care in setting up a reliable supply for the distributions. Primarily, this involved the supply of grain, which was much cheaper to import from Egypt and other fertile provinces. Within the civil Imperial administration, there was the organization of the annona, which was one of the emperor's official responsibilities (the cura annonae). Annona means here, more narrowly, the free or low-priced distributions of grain (later bread), olive oil, wine, and pork, coupled with a responsibility to provide assistance during shortages on the free market. These distributions did not involve the entire urban population, but they were of great importance to the social and political prestige of the emperors; the plebs frumentaria were essentially their clientela. A significant part of the capital's inhabitants depended for their lives on the authorities' efforts to supply Rome with grain. 4 As Claudian previously remarked, before the foundation of Constantinople, Rome had drawn on the twin granaries of Africa and Egypt. Yet after Constantine had instituted frumentationes in his new city, Africa alone was left to supply Rome, while Egypt was reserved for Constantinople. This was a seemingly noteworthy change, since Egypt has been claimed to have provided up to a third of Rome's total grain supply. Nevertheless, there are no indications that supplies from Africa (and the western Mediterranean islands) were insufficient to support those inhabitants dependent on them after 330 ce. 5 A more arduous question is to gauge just how large the urban population of the former caput mundi was in the late Roman era, and how many people profited from the grain dole. Estimates for the city population during the reign of Augustus, the best documented era in the city's ancient history, range from 750,000 to one million. 6 Even at the most conservative estimate, Rome's inhabitants probably still numbered over 500,000 during the fourth century. 7 There are of course several reasons why the population of Rome would not have been able to sustain its peak Augustan numbers. The most significant causes for demographic decline were the two great "pandemics" during the reigns of Marcus Aurelius (162 to 180) and Decius (249 to 251). 8 While there have been very recent debates about the scale and impact of these mortalityevents, as discussed exhaustively by Paul Erdkamp in this issue, there is at least consensus that they caused a significant decline in population levels from which Imperial Rome did not recover. The fact that Constantine could redirect the Egyptian grain supply from Rome to his namesake city, without triggering major social commotion further underlines this.
Equally hard to estimate is the number of people who actually profited from these distributions. Augustus took care that 200,000 citizens were allotted free grain, but that number dropped to 120,000 during the fourth century. 9 The latter number, however, may be because of a (partial) substitution of panis fiscalis for panis gradilis. Boudewijn Sirks concludes that the (annual) canon frumentarius urbis Romae amounted to over 3,910,000 modii, sufficient for circa 65,000 recipients. 10 A law of the emperor Honorius in 419 states 120,000 individuals were entitled to pork rations. 11 Nicholas Purcell has identified this as a gesture of spectacular over-provisioning, in the wake of Alaric's sack of the city almost a decade earlier. 12 But even in the first quarter of the fifth century, Rome remained the largest city of the Mediterranean world. As Paul Erdkamp has shown, at the start of the nineteenth century, the Italian hinterland alone was able to feed the urban population of Rome, ranging under 200, 000 inhabitants. 13 In the three decades between Alaric's sack of Rome (in 410) and the Vandal conquest of Carthage (in 439), the metropolitan population will still have been larger than that, probably by several hundred thousand. Import of African grain thus remained of the essence.
Even during times of peace, food shortages or manufactured panic about anticipated shortages in Rome could swiftly take a dire turn, and more than one official found it prudent to either pacify the plebs or run for his life. 14 In his contemporary history, Ammianus Marcellinus mentions how Symmachus's father's house in Trastevere was torched by a mob, because of a rumor airing his disregard for affordable wine prices. 15 Similarly, the urban prefect Tertullus had to personally confront an angry crowd, and even offered them his own sons, when ships carrying food supplies were not able to enter the city because of bad weather conditions. 16 Ammianus also preserves a wonderful vignette about the city prefect Claudius, during whose tenure the Tiber flooded many streets of Rome because of violent weather. This triggered a popular panic that was swiftly pacified by having supplies rowed in on boat. 17 The consequences of such disruptions to the Rome's grain supply in the late imperial era have certainly not lacked scholarly attention in the past. 18 Given this basic dependency on African grain, I will now re-examine its role during times of civil war and whether it was exploited by opposing sides for political gain. I will go over all civil wars of the fourth and early fifth century that affected Africa and Italy, wars that may have affected them, and wars that did not affect them, before offering some overarching conclusions.
Domitius Alexander
The case of Domitius Alexander provides us with our first and most explicit case about the position of Africa during the late Roman civil wars in the wake of the Tetrarchy's deterioration. Domitius served as vicarius of Africa when he became embroiled in a conflict with the usurper Maxentius, who held control over Italy (306 to 312). 19 He was originally a Pannonian and must have arrived quite late in his career to this position, since the few sources we have depict him as old. Our evidence is slight, but the literary sources make it clear that Domitius rose up at some point against Maxentius, after the latter's father Maximian and Diocletian had laid down power. Maxentius's usurpation was the trigger for various other usurpations and civil wars which hounded the Empire from 306 to 324. The narrative sources portray Domitius Alexander as an aged fool who was swiftly crushed by Maxentius's generals for having tried to defy him. 20 But there was more than meets the eye. One milestone from Cardonia in southern Sardinia shows that Domitius was recognized there as an emperor. 21 More importantly, another inscription set up in Domitius's African diocese lists both himself and Constantine as Augusti. 22 That Domitius recognized Constantine has been seen as attempt of the African emperor to align himself with his colleague in Gaul. As far as we can tell, the gesture was never reciprocated, since Constantine never bothered with any reference to his African "colleague" in his political communication (be it coinage, inscriptions, or panegyrics). Yet he may have given tacit support. After all, in this period the Transalpine emperor was bracing for a confrontation with Maxentius and had already pulled a few tricks to undermine him. The most ostentatious of these was harboring Maximian and entering in a political partnership with the latter by marrying his daughter Fausta. 23 Curiously, none of the unequivocally hostile sources accuse Domitius of having withheld Rome's grain shipments. 24 The so-called "Calendar of 354" does state that during Maxentius's six-year reign there was a great famine (fames magna fuit) in the city of Rome. 25 Yet neither the exact moment nor cause of this famine is stated, and it should be firmly underlined that even for the Tetrarchic era, what little information the "calendar" preserves should be treated with caution. 26 The explanation for Maxentius's violent retaliation requires a more subtle explanation. 27 By proclaiming himself emperor, and broadcasting this publicly through his coinage, Domitius Alexander made an official aspiration to universal dominion. Even though the various imperial inheritors and competitors for Diocletian's legacy were often confined to certain geographical quarters, this was no guarantee that they were to remain so indefinitely. Indeed, the fact that Domitius Alexander's claim to empire was also recognized in Sardinia was a challenge Maxentius could never have ignored, given that his rule was effectively confined to Italy now. At that time, he was anxiously monitoring both the Cottian Alps and Jura Alps for an attack by Constantine or Licinius, and Maxentius needed every ship, soldier, and supply he could get his hands on. 28 Indeed, both Lactantius and Zosimus assert that when Constantine descended into Northern Italy, Maxentius's 23 Leadbetter 2009, 199 astutely points out that the estrangement between Maxentius and his father may have been a breaking point for the African troops' allegiance to the imperial contender in Africa. Maximian had spent considerable time among them only a decade earlier to quash Mauri raids; see Pan. Lat. 8.5.2. 24 Contrary to Barnes 2011, 71; Corcoran 2017 , 63. Ridley 1982 , note 30 is aware that Zosimus nowhere claims that Domitius blocked the grain supply to Rome but presents this as an omission of fact based on the Chronographer of 354. Stathakopoulos 2004, 179 similarly acknowledges that no source mentions deliberate sabotage, yet still sees Domitius's hand in this shortage. Curiously, Linn 2012, 306 claims that "Constantine undermined Maxentius' position in Rome by stopping the grain imports from Spain and Africa." Omissi 2018, 118 equates Domitius's usurpation with the loss of African grain to Rome, without suggesting malicious intent on his behalf though. 25 Chron. 354, 16. 26 To point out some egregious errors: Valerius Severus's reign is listed as lasting "three years, four months and fifteen days" and his death as suicide. In reality, his combined reign as Caesar and Augustus barely lasted two years, and he was most likely killed on orders of Maxentius (PLRE 1: 837-38, "Fl. Val. Severus 30"). Similarly, the chronographer erroneously regards Diocletian's co-Augustus Maximian, listed as having died in Gaul, and the namesake and co-ruler of Constantine I as two different individuals, and even claims that "the latter" died in Dardania. 27 Leadbetter 2009, 218 directly equates Maxentius's loss of Africa with the famine in Rome. While it is tempting to draw this conclusion, one cannot help but observe that none of the (hostile) sources regarding Domitius do this. 28 Maxentius and Licinius had already been competing for control over the Istrian peninsula between 310 and 312, as evidenced by an inscription set up on the base of a statue at Parentium for Licinius (CIL 5.330). armies had been reinforced with African units. 29 The reality that both Africa and Sardinia had slipped out of his control could never be tolerated. It is precisely because of this that Maxentius struck back against Domitius with a vengeance. The result was a crushing defeat of the usurper in Africa and heavy reprisals for the diocese. 30
The Constantinian Dynasty
The next civil war that may have had bearing on Africa was that between Constantine's sons Constantine II and Constans, which is arguably the worst documented civil war of all those under consideration. 31 A late fourth-century source claims that the African provinces were a bone of contention between the two brothers. 32 Constantine II may have felt slighted that, though the most senior of the three brothers, he had only received the Transalpine provinces, while his youngest brother Constans received Africa, Italy, and Illyricum. At best, one could say the civil war was very much confined to a skirmish between some forces of both brothers during which Constantine II died in 340 near Aquileia. 33 What little we can glean from the paltry sources has no bearing on Africa's actual fate in this conflict. The same could also be said about the western usurper Magnentius who eliminated Constans and fought a grim two-year civil war with Constantius II (from 351 to 353). All we know is that Africa declared for Magnentius but was eventually taken over by Constantius II, after the latter had defeated his opponent in Illyricum and seized control of Italy in 351. 34 If anything, this pattern seems to confirm the thirdcentury reality that the true battlefields of the empire remained northern Italy and the Balkans.
Our next clear case of Africa's position in a late Roman civil war comes from the much better documented usurpation of Julian. Julian had been descending on Illyricum in 361, after having made his claim to the purple in Gaul against his uncle, the senior Augustus Constantius II. 35 35 Julianic scholarship abounds galore, yet for this episode in particular see Thompson 1943, 88-95; Kaegi 1975; Fournier 2010; Woods 2016. a full-scale war since Constantius unexpectedly died during his march from the East through Cilicia and bequeathed the empire to his cousin. 36 Nevertheless, both sides had taken various measures to prepare themselves for the anticipated clash. Julian spent a nerve-wracking month-and-a-half or so at Naissus, carefully monitoring the Succi pass, while Constantius was en route with his mobile field armies, and the regional army of Thrace advanced upon the passes. 37 It is at this critical point that Aquileia rebelled against him. 38 Julian was evidently not receiving the unwavering support throughout the western provinces he had hoped for. This included Africa. In his speech in praise of Julian, the Gallic rhetor Mamertinus blamed Constantius II for having denied Rome the African food supply. Thus, he states that:
When food for the Roman people and provisions for the army were occupying his attention, in the midst of the confusion of arrange for the grain supply a message came that many ships with African wheat had sailed past the coast of Achaea and were making for Constantinople. All of us were upset, and in anger at those who watched over the seacoast we approached our leader, every one of us was eager to complain that so much grain had been lost because of the spies' incompetence. But the greatest of Emperors smiling serenely replied: nothing was done amiss, grain which arrived at that city was not lost for him. 39 Scholars have been tempted to read this passage as a confirmation that the African grain supply to Italy was cut off. 40 As panegyrists tend to do, Mamertinus implies more than he explicitly blames. 41 The evidence is at best doubtful if we compare and contrast it with the account of Ammianus. According to the Greek historian, Constantius II had sent his notarius Gaudentius to Africa, and he was able to keep it loyal to the east. 42 The comes Africae Cretio then gathered his best units, and used these to guard against invasion from the west. Ammianus speaks highly of this plan since, as long as Constantius lived, Julian was not able to take hold of Africa. Nowhere does he state that Constantius in any way gave orders to disrupt the grain supply of Rome. We 36 Amm. 21.15. 37 Amm. 21.12.22. 38 Amm. 21.11. 39 Pan. Lat. 3(11).14.5-6 (trans. Nixon and Rodgers). 40 Thompson 1943, 92; Kohns 1961, 127-28; Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 415, note 94; Stathakopoulos 2004, 192-93; Linn 2012, 306. 41 Omissi 2018, 214 also remarks that this is one of the very few occasions in the speech that Mamertinus has to concede a civil war was looming, where otherwise he portrays Julian's advance on the Illyrian provinces as a "peaceful tour." 42 Amm. 21.7.2-3.
should emphasize here that we are dealing with a crucial episode in the rise to power of Julian, who above all was Ammianus's hero. 43 Mutatis mutandis, we cannot regard the historiographer as well-disposed towards Constantius by any stretch of the imagination. Should Constantius have given explicit orders to block Rome's supplies, there seems little doubt Ammianus would have pounced on it in his report. Furthermore, Ammianus makes it clear than Julian had a force ready in Sicily to cross over into Africa should that have been necessary. 44 If the grain supply had been cut off, why did this army not seek to restore direct control over Africa? Contrary to Maxentius half a century earlier, Julian enjoyed the support of Britain, Gaul, and Spain while controlling substantial tracts of Italy and the Balkans. Hence there was less pressing need to immediately seize the African diocese. The main task of Africa was to feed the city of Rome and most probably Cretio kept that side of the bargain. In fact, a careful reading of Ammianus suggests that Rome had an abundance of supplies not very long after this episode. 45 In such a situation, there was nothing particularly nefarious about Africa sending excess grain to Constantinople. We should reflect again on the specific background of both the author of the accusation and the context in which the accusation took place. One explicit concern for Julian was feeding his army. At Naissus he was bracing for his showdown with Constantius's forces and he had been actively recruiting additional soldiers in those Illyrian provinces in his dominion. It is precisely for this reason that the acquisition of Africa would have been very welcome indeed. Africa had not declared for Julian and we should reflect further on this matter. The position of Africa, unusual in not immediately siding with a western contender against a legitimate eastern Augustus-as it had done under Maxentius against Galerius initially, Constantine against Licinius, or Magnentius against Constantius II-may be explained by the allegiance and long-standing ties of its most important military and civil officials to Constantius.
Ammianus explicitly notes that the notarius Gaudentius was motivated in accomplishing his mission to secure Africa for Constantius because he dreaded Julian. 46 The comes Africae Cretio is known to have already been serving Constantius as early as 350, when he had personally communicated 43 While this is one of the longest-standing truisms in Ammianian scholarship, it is worthwhile to highlight this point again. One especially needs to consider the specific context in which he was writing during the late 380s, after a generation of virulent Christian polemic levelled against Julian. See now Ross 2016. 44 Pharr 1952, 155, note 16 and Shaw 2011, 36 , note 79 identify Cretio in CTh 7.1.4 as comes Africae. PLRE 1: 231, "Cretio," rightly points out there is no evidence for him being so as early as 349 and 350, yet is willing to accept this (see also: PLRE 1: 566, "Masaucio"). The law was issued in the name of Constantius alone, in June 349 or 350. Unless one is willing to suppose that Cretio had already been in Africa at the time of Constans's death, then threw in his lot with Constantius, only to be evicted by Magnentius and reinstated again by Constantius (for which there is no evidence), Ockham's razor suggests that Africa had sided with Magnentius and Cretio became comes Africae at a later stage. If we suggest that Constantius II rewarded Cretio with the comitiva Africae by 353, when Magnentius was vanquished, that still leaves at least eight years of service. Cretio may have already been of advanced age during Julian's usurpation, because Ammianus describes him as "former comes" at the time of Procopius's usurpation and having a son, Masaucio, old enough to be a tribune of the domestici and with sufficient experience of the African terrain. Valentinian sent Masaucio to Africa to secure it while there was still much uncertainty how his brother would fare against Procopius (Amm. 26.5.14). 48 of Africa grain had reached the Urbs. 52 A final argument against an African grain blockade against Julian is the fate of those directly involved in the diocese's surplus during the civil war. By the time he publicly performed his oration, Julian had appointed Mamertinus as Praetorian Prefect of Italy and Illyricum, and designated him consul for 362. 53 But most importantly of all, Mamertinus had also been one of the six judges who had sealed Taurus's fate at the Chalcedon tribunal, exiling a man to Vercellae whom Ammianus regarded as unjustly sentenced. 54 In the end, Mamertinus found himself in an unusual position to have indirectly both helped condemn a man in life and legacy on the basis of slight evidence, and further cement his own advancement under a new emperor.
Magnus Maximus and Eugenius
Our next example brings us to the 380s. In 383, the western emperor Gratian had been overthrown by Magnus Maximus, a commander of the British army. 55 This conflict did not spill over into Africa and Maximus contented himself for the next four years with ruling the transalpine provinces. However, in 387 Maximus invaded Italy, which resulted in a civil war with the eastern emperor Theodosius. There is some uncertainty where Africa fits in this story. At this point in time, its senior field commander was the Mauretanian aristocrat Gildo. 56 We do not have to revisit the exact details surrounding his position in the 380s, but suffice to say that while he had collaborated with Maximus in the early 370s, when both were junior officers, his command had probably been arranged by the legitimate court in Milan in the mid 380s. 57 At this point Gildo recognized Maximus as Augustus, but then again, so did Theodosius. 58 However, this means nothing more than that Africa had continued its grain shipments to Italy, as it was required to. 60 Gildo, probably following the example set by Cretio, did little more than maintain an ambiguous neutrality. This is confirmed by the fact that during Theodosius's next civil war with Eugenius, barely six years later, he received a promotion and a marriage alliance with the eastern dynasty. 61 Writing after Gildo's death, the court poet Claudian accused him of having not come to Theodosius's assistance. 62 It is probably correct that Gildo did not send active military support for the eastern campaign, but what alternative could he have contemplated? It took Theodosius two years before he sent his armies against Eugenius. In fact, the suggestion that Gildo did not send direct military support to the dynastic camp during the civil war with Maximus helps us understand why Eugenius left him alone in Africa. Gildo did not recognize Eugenius as Augustus, and looked to Constantinople for orders, but that is as far as his opposition went. The key point is that once again there is no good evidence that the African grain fleets to Rome were interrupted during either usurpation. Accordingly, Maximus and Eugenius were willing to tolerate the passive hostility of Gildo, whilst focusing their efforts on the more dire threat posed by Theodosius.
Gildo
So far our investigation is yielding slim pickings. Six civil wars spanning more than eighty years and we have not yet encountered a shred of affirmative evidence that the African grain supply was used as a weapon. 66 Symmachus also mentions that African annonae had been meager prior to Gildo's formal renunciation of western administration, indicating that the latter may have been gradually trimming them before finally axing them. 67 Even as late as during Stilicho's third consulship in 400, two years after the revolt, Claudian deemed it important to remind his Italian audience of the successful provisioning his patron had arranged during this crisis. 68 There is no reason to doubt the panegyrist's word for it. Stilicho's restoration of Rome's annonae during Gildo's defeat was publicly celebrated in a dedication on a statue base set up for him by local guilds:
In honor of Flavius Stilicho, vir clarissimus and inlustris, magister utriusque militiae and consul ordinarius, out of high regard for great deed, among the benefits which have been conferred through him upon the city of Rome, the guilds of river-boatmen and the fishermen of the city of Rome, through whom food supplies are conveyed to the City in river boats, greatly moved, because of having replenished Rome with food supplies by subduing Gildo, public enemy, he increased the blessedness . . . 69
The question remains why Gildo suddenly decided to pursue a tactic he had not entertained during the two previous civil wars. The answer lies in the 63 Claud. de IV cons. Hon. 439-59. On Stilicho's second Greek campaign against Alaric, see O 'Flynn 1983, 28-36; Heather 1991, 199-205; Kulikowski 2007, 165-68. 64 vastly changed political context and, above all, the shift in imperial leadership. 70 Since the apex of the so-called "Third Century Crisis," the emperor's role as mobile supreme commander had become paramount. 71 All emperors from the 260s until the 380s tried to live up to this model (with the understandable exception of the infant Valentinian II). When Theodosius I died, however, he was succeeded by sons who had already been elevated as children and were to remain ceremonial capital-bound rulers. 72 It is in this vacuum of military authority that individuals such as Stilicho tried to seize more influence over court and government, often effectively establishing a hegemony in the process. 73 Stilicho, as husband of Theodosius's adopted daughter Serena and guardian of the emperor's younger son and new western Augustus Honorius, also claimed such suzerainty over Arcadius, based on the alleged deathbed exhortation of the late emperor. 74 These publicly broadcast aspirations unsurprisingly caused a rift between Milan and Constantinople, given that individuals in the eastern twin regime were just as unwilling to let pas the opportunity for greater clout at Arcadius's court. Stilicho used Alaric's mutiny in Greece twice as an opportunity to march a field army into the Balkans, raising tremendous anxiety in the eastern capital. Gildo's decision to block the African grain supply can only be understood in this light. 75 By 397, Gildo was the longest serving western senior commander and will have been just as alarmed by the parvenu Stilicho's power-grab in the army. Claudian's propaganda has for centuries obfuscated that his patron was an eastern outsider, who had marched with Theodosius to the west against Eugenius, and had fought against the very same army that he now had to lead himself. 76 Stilicho had only been governing the west for about two years, and had not yet completely established his authority over the army, as demonstrated by its poor discipline during the first campaign against Alaric. 77 Hence, we have to see Gildo's bold stance as trying to strike at a superior whose authority was precarious. By disrupting the grain supply, he could wreak havoc on the senatorial elites in the city, who had emerged as a new block on whom 70 McEvoy 2013 is the new seminal study on this topic. See also Lee 2013, 81-94 . 71 Hebblewhite 2017. 72 PLRE 1: 99, "Flavius Arcadius 5," and 442, "Fl. Honorius 3." 73 Such individuals have been anachronistically but aptly styled as "generalisismos." The usage of this label goes back to early twentieth-century scholarship but has been entrenched since O'Flynn 1983. 74 Cameron 1969 still remains fundamental on this issue. 75 Wijnendaele 2017a. Orosius finds one explanation for Gildo's decision as being influenced by "believing that there was little hope to be had in the rule of two young boys" (Oros. 7.36.3).
76 McEvoy 2013 , 154-55. 77 O'Flynn 1983 Stilicho depended for political support. 78 Meanwhile, he also transferred the allegiance of the African provinces to the court in Constantinople. 79 At this point in time, Stilicho was still embroiled in his struggle against Alaric. These two measures were clearly intent on triggering a crisis that would sweep away the western generalissimo. The African commander came very close to achieving this and Stilicho had to issue various emergency measures to tackle Gildo's challenge, such as suspending his Gothic campaign, having the senate declare Gildo hostis publicus, arranging the aforementioned Transalpine provisions, and sending a crack force to Africa containing some of the finest palatine regiments in winter, the most dangerous sailing season. 80 In hindsight, this campaign turned out to be a complete success, with Gildo's army swiftly defeated and Gildo himself dying in the aftermath. 81 Yet the revolt of Gildo's elder brother Firmus a generation earlier demonstrates that this could have turned into a long drawn-out guerilla struggle. 82 Gildo failed, but the potential terror invoked by his tactic had been clearly demonstrated. This is most conspicuous in the aftermath of events at Rome. Earlier, the city prefect Symmachus judged it sensible to retreat from the Urbs so as not to be caught up in any potential wrath of the mob regarding their pleas for food. 83 The latter demanded his return, however, and once the crisis was resolved, even organized a lynchparty of grain officials from Africa. 84
Priscus Attalus
Probably our best documented case of what cutting off Rome's annonae could unleash comes from the usurpation of Priscus Attalus (409 to 410). 85 Even though Attalus was a puppet of the Gothic commander Alaric, it is insightful to regard his elevation as part of a civil war with the imperial government in which Alaric sought to achieve a legitimate military command for himself and 78 Matthews 1975, 264-68. 79 Oros. 7.36.2. That Constantinople briefly accepted governance over Africa can be gleaned from the fact that the western praetorian prefect, Theodorus, only received decrees concerning Italy during the period from 397 to 398. Even in the aftermath of Gildo's suppression, Claudian had to acknowledge that there had been a brief eastern transfer (191) (192) (193) (194) (195) (196) (197) (198) (199) (200) de cons. Stil. I, a settlement for his army. 86 Alaric had already besieged Rome once in late 408 and cut off its supplies to pressure the senate into negotiations. 87 At this point a first famine occurred, during which even Gratian's widow Laeta helped distribute supplies to the common people. 88 The emperor Honorius's court staunchly refused to concede any of Alaric's desiderata. As a result, Alaric and the Roman senate proclaimed the city prefect Attalus as their own emperor in late 409. However, Attalus failed to bring the African provinces into his fold. 89 In retaliation, the local commander Heraclianus cut off the grain supply:
Meanwhile Heraclianus had killed Constans and stationed guards in the ports and along the coast of Africa. He also stopped the sailing of merchantmen to Rome. As a result the Romans began to suffer from famine and sent a delegation to Attalus about this [ . . . ] The famine became so bad that chestnuts were used in place of grain and some people were suspected of cannibalism. 90
As we can tell from the sources, Heraclianus's blockade of the grain supply was a vexation for Attalus's government. Just as Stilicho in 397, Attalus tried to resort to nearby resources. A letter from Paulinus of Nola tells us how the navicularii of Sardinia, who also shipped grain to Rome in the service of the annona, tried to aid the starving population of Rome during the winter of 409. 91 However, because they were obliged to do this so late in the year, they were hit by a storm and many vessels were wrecked on the shore, since they had been driven off their course. The crew, with the exception of an elderly sailor, had to abandon ship, which eventually stranded on the shores of Lucania. As noted previously, navigation during the winter was hazardous and this operation was clearly a last resort. The eventual results were devastating, as demonstrated by the report in Zosimus, following the Olympiodoran tradition:
Heraclianus held all the ports in Africa under such strict guard that neither grain nor oil nor any other provisions could be conveyed to Rome, and a famine struck the city far worse than the previous one. The sellers in the market place hid what goods they had in the hope of making a fortune by 86 Delaplace 2015, 138-50. 87 Olympiod. fr. 7.2; Zos. 5.39.1. 88 Zos. 5.39.4. 89 Zos. 6.4.5-6 and 6.9.1-2. 90 
Heraclianus
Rather surprisingly, we hear Heraclianus suspending the grain-shipments again in 413. 96 It has often been stated that in this year he staged a usurpation and as a result of this, crossed over to Italy with his army, only to be swiftly defeated. 97 I have recently argued that allegations that Heraclianus staged a usurpation must be false. 98 This contention primarily rests on two arguments: the fact that Heraclianus never struck any coins, the clearest sign to broadcast imperial aspirations, and that even the laws in the Theodosian Code regarding his downfall do not refer to him as a tyrannus but as a hostis [publicus] . 99 His revolt was most probably aimed at the new supreme commander Constantius, since the latter had been undermining him for some time. 100 But why did 92 Zos. 6.11.1-2. 93 On "famine foods," see Garnsey 1999, 36-41; Stathakopoulos 2004, 81-87. 94 Garnsey 1988, 28-29. 95 Heraclianus suspend the grain shipments to Rome? It is difficult to understand what he could have hoped to achieve by targeting Rome in this way, especially given the recent calamities he had indirectly wrought upon the city. One suggestion is that this action was not really aimed at Rome at all, and that whatever harm it suffered was merely collateral damage. 101 It has been plausibly suggested that Heraclianus suspended grain shipments to Rome not to attack the city itself but in order to sabotage the new supreme commander Constantius's agreement with Athaulf in Gaul. The key point here is that Constantius had promised food provisions to Athaulf in return for the destruction of the Gallic usurper Jovinus, which had been duly carried out, and the safe return of Galla Placidia, Honorius's half-sister and their hostage since the sack of Rome in 410. 102 However, when the time came, Constantius was unable to make good on his promises, and the Goths turned hostile once more. 103 There can be no doubt that Heraclianus's revolt was the immediate cause of Constantius's inability to provide the Goths with grain, and the key factor in provoking the resumption of hostilities between Athaulf and the imperial government. 104 When a settlement was finally reached in 416, no less than 600,000 modii of grain were granted to the Goths. 105 Given the abysmal state of Italy in the previous decade, following the wars with Radagaisus, Alaric, and Athaulf, and the fact that the other grain-rich provinces such as southern Gaul and Spain were still outside dynastic control, only Africa will have been able to supply such a grand amount. The figure of 600,000 modii may also go some way towards explaining the outlandishly high attributed number of ships in Heraclianus's fleet that set sail to Italy-3,700 according to Orosius. 106 Stewart Oost suggested that the majority of Heraclianus's fleet were grain ships loaded with the dole. This suggestion is very plausible. 107 Most scholars since Courtois agree that it was this same annona fleet that provided the core of Vandal raiding parties during Geiseric's reign. Similarly, the Spanish chronicler Hydatius had access to a unique source containing, among other execution of Olympius, Heraclianus's patron, this will have sent a message to the latter that he was in immediate danger (Oros. 7.42.12; Olymp. fr. 8; Philost. HE. 12.1). 101 Contrary to Blockley 1998, 131. 102 PLRE 2: 888-89, "Aelia Galla Placidia 4." 103 Olymp. fr. 22.1. 104 Stein 1959, 266; Jones 1964, 188; Oost 1968, 120; Matthews 1975, 316; Bleckmann 1997, 588. 105 Olymp. fr. 30. 106 Oros. 7.42.13. 107 In the late Empire, naves frumentariae tended to be rather small ships with a lesser tonnage and loading capacity of perhaps 2,000 to 10,000 modii (in contrast with the 50,000 of the Principate); see Tengström 1975, 37 . The transport of 600,000 modii in 413 could accordingly have required anywhere between 60 to 300 ships. things, the location of Heraclianus's defeat at Utriculum. 108 Hydatius states that 50,000 soldiers died at this battle. Naturally, both the numbers of 3,700 ships and 50,000 casualties are extremely suspect and implausible. 109 Yet they do indicate a large scale, and this is best explained by Heraclianus's having mobilized the entire African field army for his adventure, for which any war fleet docked at Carthage would have been insufficient for transport. 110 Hence, he will have requested a wide variety of all possible ships to both transport his soldiers and simultaneously redirect the grain originally promised to the Goths. While Heraclianus was spectacularly defeated, he did succeed in thwarting Constantius's pact with Athaulf, thus igniting open war between the two parties for the next years.
Bonifatius
Our final example is that of the comes Africae Bonifatius. 111 He was a known partisan of Placidia, whom Honorius had exiled to Constantinople together with her infant son Valentinian in 423. 112 When Honorius died on 15 August 423, there is reason to suppose that Theodosius II had been intending to leave the western throne vacant, while the local magister militum Castinus oversaw western affairs. Theodosius could have immediately elevated Valentinian as western emperor if he had wished to do so, since Valentinian was a nephew of the late western Augustus and present at his court. However, Theodosius refrained from doing so and did not even consider Valentinian as western consul for 424. 113 The eastern emperor's stance vis-à-vis the twin regime of the West did not go unnoticed. The contemporary western chronicler Prosper noted that when Honorius died, Theodosius II "held power over the entire empire," while a generation later the western chronicler Hydatius remarked that after Honorius's death, Theodosius "ruled the empire alone." 114 Bonifatius, being allied to Placidia and a nemesis of Castinus, has been reported as having done everything in his power to restore the dowager-empress. 115 One of these things could have been disrupting the African annonae.
It has to be clearly stated that there is no explicit mention in the sources of his having ever cut off the African grain supply. 116 Yet there are good reasons to suppose he had at least threatened to do so, as an attempt to restore Valentinian in the aftermath of Honorius's death in August 423. 117 The western throne had been vacant for three months when the primicerius notariorum Ioannes had himself proclaimed emperor on 20 November 423. 118 The exact motivation for his usurpation is unknown. Contrary to Honorius, however, who had spent the last twenty years of his reign almost exclusively in Ravenna, Ioannes was proclaimed in Rome, the city most vulnerable to any disruption of its annona. 119 The date of 20 November is crucial. At the end of November, the sailing season in the Mediterranean came to end since it began to be more perilous to cross the sea. 120 If the African grain shipments would not recommence in spring 424, the city would be facing a grave crisis.
A further argument to support this hypothesis is that Ioannes's regime sent an army to Africa in early 424, despite the fact that the usurper's overtures to Constantinople had been firmly rejected and war was nigh. 121 Indeed, Prosper explicitly states that "Ioannes's defences were weaker because he tried to recapture Africa." 122 The situation was nevertheless deemed threatening enough to divest critical military resources to Africa, thereby lending further credibility to the possibility that the restoration of the grain supply to Rome was their top priority. With Bonifatius, we go militarily back full circle to a dynamic already conspicuous in Domitius Alexander's days. On the eve of a civil war with another emperor, an illegitimate regime in Italy was weakened due to lack of support from other western provinces, especially Africa. It should be emphasized that, contrary to Domitius's gamble, the specific chronological indications surrounding Ioannes's elevation make it plausible that Bonifatius had ushered such threats previously. Given that his service of records in the diocese goes back to sometime between 416 and 417 at the latest, he will have been aware of the importance of the annonae to Rome and the precedents set in this region by Gildo and Heraclianus. 123 Last but not least, Bonifatius had direct experience with the potential repercussions of such disruptions, since he had personally fought Athaulf at Marseilles in 413 when the latter was desperate for supplies due to Heraclianus's sabotage. 124 The most crucial difference since Domitius's days, however, was that this time the African army was able to stand its ground, thereby giving the Theodosian army a larger window of opportunity to root out Ioannes's regime in 425. 125
The African Military
Surveying these various instances, a few unifying elements can be discerned. Out of ten known civil wars, only two (Gildo in 397 and Heraclianus in 410) featured the intentional abolition of the grain trade to Rome beyond doubt. A case could be made that this tactic was considered and even been threatened by Bonifatius in 423. It seems plausible that this was not done by Heraclianus in 413, but that he instead redirected critical provisions meant for Athaulf's Goths. At best, this makes four out of ten cases, or on a more conservative note, two out of ten. More importantly, we can say that this achieved its goals in only two cases (Heraclianus in 410 and Bonifatius in 423), and partially so in two more cases (Gildo in 397 and Heraclianus in 413). As mentioned, however, it is not a coincidence that these successful or partially successful cases are all from the early fifth century or on its threshold. Surveying these cases, it is clear the African military was rarely directly involved in these civil wars, for the same reason that usurpation of the imperial office in Africa almost never happened (Domitius Alexander's being the final example). A usurper who wished to succeed needed sufficient military backing; hence Britain and Gaul, with their regional armies and proximity to the Rhine armies, were far better "breeding grounds" for usurpers. 126 Africa lacked the military clout a contender for imperial power required. No western emperor visited Africa after the tetrarch Maximian in 298, and the diocese had become effectively a military backwater during the fourth century. 127 123 Aug. Ep. 185. 124 Olymp. fr. 22.2. 125 Olymp. fr. 43; Prosp. s. a. 425; Chron. Gall. 452, 99; Hyd. 75 (84) ; Marcell. s. a. 425.1. 126 Wardman 1984, 235. 127 On Maximian's itinerary in Africa, see Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 117, note 18. The African army could not compete in quantitative or qualitative terms with that of Italy (the main theater from which to expect retaliation). 128 The majority of the African units listed were frontier garrison troops (limitanei) whose primary duty was to maintain internal security. Only four units, perhaps a total of 2,000 or 3,000 soldiers, were proper comitatenses. 129 This is confirmed by some of the other sources we have. Ammianus, for instance, notes that Theodosius "the elder" was sent with 2,500 soldiers to deal with Firmus's rebellion in the early 370s, but once on the ground Theodosius was able to draw upon man-power from the regional field army. 130 Indeed, Stilicho sent a crack force of 5,000 men to crush Gildo in 398, when the latter was able to call upon the field army which he had commanded for more than twelve years, Mauri allies and his patrimonial retainers. 131 At the battle of Utriculum in 413, Heraclianus is reported to have gone down with 50,000 soldiers. 132 As stated previously, the number is naturally extremely suspect, but a total of 5,000 combatants on each side would be a plausible estimate given previous figures. Another argument in support of such an estimate for the field army is continuity with the early imperial period, during which only a single legion garrisoned Africa. 133 Contrary to most other late Roman frontier provinces, military threats to Africa had scarcely increased. By the time the Vandals invaded in the late 420s, the vast majority of cities were not even properly fortified. Given these numbers, the African military will generally have been extremely reluctant to engage in head-on confrontations with continental comitatenses.
The fate of Domitius Alexander may have resonated throughout the fourth century and later writers remembered the harsh reprisals in the diocese following his demise. 134 Local commanders, such as Cretio in 360 and Gildo in the early 390s, were undoubtedly aware how far they could support eastern emperors without provoking western usurpers. The civil wars they witnessed provide the clearest evidence that the African grain supply was not considered 128 For the African military establishment in the Late Empire, see Hoffman 1968; Modéran 2014, 103-13. 129 It should be noted here that the Notita Dignitatum lists a large number of comitatenses for the African Provinces (Not. Dig. Occ. 7). Yet, the vast majority of these were pseudocomitatenses, that is, former limitanei who were enrolled in the field army and merely received a paper upgrade. See also Wijnendaele 2015, 59 Le Bohec 1989; Cherry 1998. 134 Aur. Vict. 40.12; Zos. 2.12.14. Nota bene that Aurelius Victor's own father had been a poor African farmer (Aur. Vict. 33), who may have been young enough to have had firsthand knowledge of these reprisals. a useful "weapon" that they could immediately resort to. In both cases an eastern emperor either already held Africa or tried luring it into its sphere of influence. But regional commanders in Africa could not afford to confront western usurpers, who commanded superior armies and governed southern Gaul and Spain whose grain levies they could rely upon if necessary. Most importantly, starving out Rome could barely alter the military balance for most of the fourth century. 135 The metropolis was no longer a political center, due to the absence of emperors, and the real battles were almost inevitably fought in Gaul, northern Italy, or the Illyrian provinces. In an empire-wide civil war between two or more emperors, the comites Africae were by-standers who at best usually preferred not to get entangled in the collateral damage. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that on those occasions when political players in Africa were sucked into the vortex of civil war, they almost inevitably tried to ally themselves with one of the great contenders rather than get involved directly. It is precisely because of this that Heraclianus's revolt in 413 is so exceptional in crossing over into Italy with an army; to the best of my knowledge, the only time in Roman imperial history this was ever attempted. It virtually screams "act of desperation."
Nevertheless, we should not completely dismiss the level of fear the prospect of annulled grain shipments could project. A contemporary propagandist like Mamertinus was aware of the disquiet this could raise for an emperor who never visited Rome. Roman citizens turned on their municipal government and its key officials when prices rose and starvation threatened, as we have seen in the Gildonian crisis. Riots, attacks on imperial officials, and destruction of infrastructure triggered by food shortages were an embarrassment to reigning emperors. Despite their absence, most fourth-century Roman emperors did continue to look after Rome's interests. 136 One obvious tactic to alleviate potential shortages was to build granaries where grain could be stocked up, usually near Ostia and Portus. 137 Not coincidentally, Alaric's first move to put pressure on the city of Rome in 408 was to station troops near Portus in order to prevent supplies from these warehouses reaching the city. 138 135 The sole exception may be Constantine's campaign against Maxentius, who was the only fourth century emperor to rule from Rome. Omissi 2018, 120, note 84 observes on the basis of Pan. Lat. 12.25.2 that there may have been a naval element to the invasion of Italy, aimed at provoking famine in Rome. This, combined with the recent turmoil in Africa, may have prevented the city from have sufficient supplies for Maxentius to consider making a stand behind Rome's walls, as he had successfully done against Galerius and Severus. 136 Finally, scarcity could be exploited by those in possession of food stocks to let prices soar and profiteer in the process, thus causing further distress. 139 Hence, the mere threat of delayed or suspended African annonae will have been a veritably frightening prospect for many Roman citizens, senators, and urban officials.
Conclusion
As a military tactic, cutting off the African grain supply from Italy hardly achieved military goals, since its victims were almost inevitably bound to be the civilian population of Rome and not the field armies stationed north of the peninsula. 140 Yet wars are not won through arms alone. Plutarch already mentions "'kicking [them] in the belly,' and devising every means for cutting off food" in his biography of the Republican aristocrat Lucullus, who delivered a decisive blow to Mithridates VI Eupator's armies in the 70s bce this way. 141 At the very end of the sixth century ce, an eastern Roman military manual produced in the entourage of the emperor Mauricius stated that: "It is well to hurt the enemy by deceit, by raids or by hunger, and never be enticed into a pitched battle." 142 Similarly, Vegetius's Epitoma rei militaris remarks that "hunger, they say, fights from within, and often conquers without a blow." 143 There is a good reason why we see this tactic attested during the reign of Honorius, and with success. This shift is not a chronological coincidence or merely linked to the western empire's shrinking sovereignty over its Transalpine provinces as the fifth century progressed, though this eventually mattered as well. It was above all the new nature of imperial rule that provided the stimulus for this tactic to achieve more success. Challenging a military emperor, such as Maxentius or Julian, from Africa was a disaster waiting to happen, as Domitius Alexander discovered to his dismay. However, the entrenchment of child-emperor rule in 395 and the rise of generalissimos created new opportunities for trial-runs with political foul play. Unlike the emperor, whose position and powers were fully acknowledged, there was no strict legality to a western military supreme commander's position who wished to take over governmental affairs as a "military manager." 144 Individuals like Stilicho achieved this position through a combination of sheer armed power and a nexus of alliances with various factions in the imperial family and Italy's civilian elites. All fifth-century western generalissimos needed support from Italy, where the largest field army was stationed, where the court had moved on a permanent basis since the 390s, and where its senatorial families dominated the civilian offices in government. 145 The moment, however, a generalissimo started losing political support from one or more of these key groups, as happened with Stilicho in 408, he became more vulnerable than an incumbent dynastic emperor. 146 Unsurprisingly, the nature of fifth-century western Roman civil war changed in due course. 147 Such civil wars no longer centered on one emperor attacking or defending himself against a usurper, in which Africa was forced to either take sides or maintain a precarious neutrality. After the last flare-up of traditional usurpations in the Transalpine provinces between 406 and 412, usurpation of the imperial office ceased to be a viable strategy for political opposition in the fifth-century western Roman empire. Instead we see, from the reign of Honorius onward, a proliferation of insubordinations and revolts inside the western Roman officer class aimed against their superior, the magister utriusque militae. It is only in this constellation that the African field commanders suddenly were in a position to achieve more leverage than they ever held throughout the fourth century. The moment a rival in Africa wished to weaken the major military power-broker at the western court, he did hold a trump card for striking the latter's senatorial connections based in the city of Rome. His best chance came at a time when an aspiring generalissimo had not yet established his hegemony in Italy properly (such as Gildo versus Stilicho, Heraclianus versus Alaric, or Bonifatius versus Castinus), or was committed to a major campaign outside Italy (again, Gildo versus Stilicho or Heraclianus versus Constantius). This is why Heraclianus was so spectacularly successful in 410, because Alaric-whose initial wish was to take over Stilicho's position-only held sway over Rome and Tuscany. The moment Heraclianus axed the grain supply to Rome, the fate of Attalus' regime was sealed. 144 To use the terminology of McEvoy 2013. 145 On the rise of Italian senators in western imperial governments from the end of the fourth century onwards, see Matthews 1975, chapter 10; Heather 2016, 17-21. 146 Kulikowski 2013; Wijnendaele 2018a. 147 Börm 2013, 71-72; Wijnendaele 2018b. What we see happening in the early fifth century was a return to a strategy first enacted by Pompeius Magnus, and most successfully pursued by his son Sextus, during the downfall of the Republic in the 40s and 30s bce. Especially during the early years of the second triumvirate, the Pompeian tactic of cutting off Italy's supplies from Sicily and Sardinia successfully turned the people of Rome against Octavian and his allies, until they saw no alternative but to negotiate with him. 148 Yet this only worked in the precise conditions of the first half of the 30s bce, when Octavian had no direct control over the western islands (in Sextus's hands), or Africa (in Lepidus's hands). Similarly, during the infamous "year of four emperors" (69 ce), the imperial contender Vespasian considered this tactic, due to his control over Egypt's vast grain resources and determination to dislodge Vitellius from Italy. 149 This tactic, just like civil war itself, was extraordinary, however, since no emperor in the Principate could afford substantially to aggravate the living conditions of the vast majority of citizens in the metropolis that was his (soon-to-be) seat of power. Even in the later Roman Empire, cutting off the African grain supply to Rome remained the "nuclear option." Its victims were almost inevitably civilian and it rarely changed the larger military course of actions. However, it could be employed successfully to politically destabilize an opponent whose position in Italy was already brittle. Concerning economy and politics, Peter Garnsey judged that in antiquity food was power. 150 Only during the reign of Honorius can we assert that the African grain supply became something more: a fickle weapon.
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